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Note
If It’s in the Game, Is It in the Game?: Examining
League-Wide Licensing Agreements After
American Needle
Talon Powers*
It was a cloudy morning in 1984 as an Amtrak train made
its way through the Rocky Mountains on its way to Oakland,
1
California. Three men sat deep in discussion in its dining car.
The first man, a then 48-year-old John Madden, had recently
wrapped up a Hall of Fame and Super Bowl winning coaching
2
career and was transitioning to a role as a “televised NFL
3
evangelist.” The other two, Trip Hawkins and Joe Ybarra,
were evangelists in their own right, but instead of advocating
football through the medium of television, they wanted to connect people to the game through their video game company,
4
Electronic Arts. While Madden was intrigued by their idea, he
was only interested if the finished product reflected “real foot5
ball.” The drive to get Madden’s approval and get the game
right drove the creators to make a game that included all of the
teams and players, in an attempt to simulate the National
6
Football League (NFL) as a whole. This drive became Electronic Arts’s rallying cry, inspiring the 1992 company tagline, “If

* Copyright © 2013 by Talon Powers. This piece is dedicated to the
memory of Tamar Hanna Kaplan, an eternal support while writing this and
the love of my life. Thank you for making me into the person I am today.
1. Patrick Hruby, The Franchise: The Inside Story of How “Madden
NFL” Became a Video Game Dynasty, ESPN.COM (Aug. 5, 2010), http://sports
.espn.go.com/espn/eticket/story?page=100805/madden.
2. See John Madden, PROFOOTBALLHOF.COM, http://www.profootballhof
.com/hof/member.aspx?PLAYER_ID=255 (last visited Apr. 21, 2013) (providing
the statistical, historical, and biographical arguments for John Madden’s enshrinement in the Pro Football Hall of Fame).
3. Hruby, supra note 1.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
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7

it’s in the game, it’s in the game.” Madden NFL Football’s unquestioned success led to a $300 million dollar, five-year exclusive licensing agreement between Electronic Arts and the National Football League in 2004, which has subsequently been
8
extended to 2013.
After the Supreme Court’s decision in American Needle,
Inc. v. National Football League in 2010, however, the NFL’s
ability to license League intellectual property as a collective
9
whole has been called into question. In his opinion written for
a unanimous Court, Justice John Paul Stevens ruled that because individual teams have distinct interests in selling their
team intellectual property, the League cannot be viewed as a
single entity for the purposes of licensing team logos and mer10
chandise. In Section VI of Justice Stevens’s decision, however,
he identifies some reasons that the League may justifiably act
collectively in order to achieve certain ends tailored to “[t]he
11
special characteristics of this industry.”
If the case law that emerges from American Needle completely precludes the League from being treated as a single entity, any licensing agreement of the NFL or other professional
sports league risks being challenged as a concerted conspiracy
in restraint of trade under Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust
12
Act. Applying the Sherman Act to activities taken by the NFL
in licensing its own intellectual property in the same way it has
been applied to teams collectively licensing their individual intellectual property would create problems for the NFL’s agree13
ment with Electronic Arts, for obtaining essential sponsorship
14
money, for professional sports collective bargaining agree7. Evan Ratliff, Sports Rule!, WIRED.COM (Jan. 2003), http://www.wired
.com/wired/archive/11.01/sports.html.
8. Hruby, supra note 1.
9. Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat’l Football League, 130 S. Ct. 2201 (2010).
10. Id. at 2212–13.
11. Id. at 2216 (quoting Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 516 U.S. 231, 252
(1996)).
12. Sherman Antitrust Act § 1, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006).
13. See Lisa Pike Masteralexis, American Needle v. National Football
League and the Future of Collective Licensing Agreements in Sport, 19 SPORT
MKTG. Q. 166, 168 (2010) (arguing that the exclusive licensing agreement between the NFL and Electronic Arts rests on questionable legal ground after
American Needle).
14. See John A. Fortunato & Shannon E. Martin, American Needle v.
NFL: Legal and Sponsorship Implications, 9 U. DENV. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 73,
81 (2010) (concluding that uniform sponsorship agreements may be unlikely in
a world where each team can argue that it has an inherent right to contract
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15

ments more broadly, and for every other major professional
sports league in protecting league interests against players and
16
renegade owners. While American Needle clearly states that
17
the NFL cannot be uniformly treated as a single entity, the
League acts very differently when it packages and sells team
logos (as in American Needle) than it does when it licenses every aspect of the League together in order to create a virtual recreation of the League as a whole (as in its license with Elec18
tronic Arts). The distinction between the League bundling its
teams’ intellectual property and the League licensing itself as a
whole justifies another look at whether leagues like the NFL
should be granted single-entity status in limited and specific
instances.
This Note argues that courts should draw a distinction between licensing agreements that bundle and sell the distinct
intellectual property of a team and agreements that license the
intellectual property of the League as a whole. Part I illustrates
the evolution of the National Football League into a revenuesharing organization, establishes the history of the singleentity defense in antitrust law, and explains the reasoning of
both the Seventh Circuit and the Supreme Court in deciding
American Needle. Part II examines how collective licensing
functions with regard to the League and consumers and uses
video game licensing to illustrate the difficulties inherent in a
strict Rule of Reason analysis. Finally, Part III identifies some
potential solutions and proposes an exemption following Section VI of the American Needle decision that would grant single-entity treatment to league-wide licensing while retaining
the American Needle rule for packaged licensing of individual
team intellectual properties. This Note concludes by arguing
competitively).
15. See Irwin A. Kishner & Julie Albinsky, Very Much Ado About . . .
Nothing: An Analysis of the Impact of American Needle v. NFL on Collective
Bargaining and Merchandising in Professional Sports, 29 ENT. & SPORTS LAW.
3, 6 (2011) (illustrating the potential for collective bargaining challenges when
the NFL’s uniform bargaining position is called into question).
16. See Michael A. McCann, American Needle v. NFL: An Opportunity to
Reshape Sports Law, 119 YALE L.J. 726, 767–75 (2010) (exploring implications
for other sports leagues, including the NBA and the NHL).
17. Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat’l Football League, 130 S. Ct. 2201, 2212
(2010).
18. See Brief for Electronic Arts, Inc. as Amicus Curiae Supporting the
NFL Respondents at 9, Am. Needle, 130 S. Ct. at 2201 (No. 08-661), 2009 WL
4074860 (claiming that the relationship between the League and Electronic
Arts requires a unique operating relationship).
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that the impact on competitive balance, the ability of a league
to market itself, and the ability of a league to effectively coordinate and innovate with exclusive partners all justify singleentity treatment where the league is licensing itself as a whole.
I. THE EVOLUTION OF AND CHALLENGES TO THE
NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE AS A COLLECTIVE
ENTITY
The broad economic underpinnings of the NFL, the underlying facts of the case, the single-entity argument more generally, and the lower court rulings are all essential to understanding the Supreme Court’s decision in American Needle.
This Part examines each of those in turn.
A. THE GROWTH OF THE NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE AS A
COLLECTIVE ENTITY
The National Football League was organized in 1920 as an
19
unincorporated association of professional football teams. Prior to 1963, each team in the League made separate agreements
for the marketing and licensing of its individual intellectual
20
property. Because individual teams operated in discrete markets of differing size and economic activity, individualized licensing risked exacerbating already existing economic imbal21
ances across the League. NFL Commissioner Pete Rozelle
viewed this as a fundamental problem, arguing that only an
economically balanced league could create the competitive equi22
ty necessary for commercial success. After persuading a majority of the NFL’s owners that promotion of the League as a
whole against other forms of entertainment was in the NFL’s
collective self-interest, Rozelle succeeded in convincing the
19. Am. Needle, 130 S. Ct. at 2207.
20. Id.
21. See, e.g., DAVID BLEVINS, 2 THE SPORTS HALL OF FAME ENCYCLOPEDIA
836 (2012) (observing that when Pete Rozelle became Commissioner of the
NFL in 1960, the NFL “consisted of 10 teams playing a 12-game schedule to
half-empty stadiums, with only a few teams having television deals”).
22. McCann, supra note 16, at 732 n.23 (citing David Harris, Pete Rozelle:
The Man Who Made Football an American Obsession, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 15,
1984, § 6, at 12). For an econometric analysis validating Rozelle’s belief in revenue sharing as a competitive good, see Jake I. Fisher, The NFL’s Current
Business Model and the Potential 2011 Lockout 11–12 (May 4, 2010), (unpublished essay, Harvard University) http://harvardsportsanalysis.files
.wordpress.com/2009/09/the-nfl-business-model-and-potential-lockout.pdf (arguing that revenue sharing creates the optimal conditions for teams to both
create a competitive product and to maximize relative revenue).

2356

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[97:2352
23

League’s teams to collectively promote the League’s brand. To
that end, the NFL instituted a program of revenue sharing in
which approximately 60% of revenues would be generated by
the League itself and equally distributed among teams, while
the teams would separately raise and retain the remaining 40%
24
of League revenue. By the 2001–02 season, the League was
generating $2.6 billion in shared revenue, an average of $72
25
million for each team. Not only are such figures substantial,
but shared revenues from licensing represent the fastest grow26
ing sector of the NFL’s economic model. Such licensing arrangements have proven so successful that they are considered
27
essential to the professional sports model.
As a component of their revenue sharing program, the
League formed NFL Properties (NFLP), a distinct corporate entity tasked with “(1) developing, licensing, and marketing the
intellectual property the teams owned, such as their logos,
trademarks, and other indicia; and (2) ‘conduct[ing] and
engag[ing] in advertising campaigns and promotional ventures
28
on behalf of the NFL and [its] member [teams].’” From 1963
until 2000, NFLP granted headwear licenses to a number of
23. Am. Needle Inc. v. Nat’l Football League, 538 F.3d 736, 737 (7th Cir.
2008), rev’d sub nom. Am. Needle, 130 S. Ct. at 2201; see also McCann, supra
note 16, at 731–32 (elucidating Rozelle’s ideological vision of the NFL’s future
being tied to all team owners viewing themselves as stakeholders in a larger
league project).
24. Fisher, supra note 22, at 3–4 (extrapolating based on shareholder information provided by the Green Bay Packers, who are publicly owned). The
League claims to evenly share over eighty percent of total revenues. Nathaniel
Grow, American Needle and the Future of the Single Entity Defense Under
Section One of the Sherman Act, 48 AM. BUS. L.J. 449, 490 (2011) (citing Brief
for the NFL Respondents at 6, Am. Needle, 130 S. Ct. at 2201 (No. 08-661)).
25. Ellen Terrell et al., The Sports Industry: Football, BUS. & ECON. RES.
ADVISOR (Summer 2005), available at http://www.loc.gov/rr/business/BERA/
issue3/football.html.
26. See One.Cool.Customer, NFL Lockout 2011: The NFL’s Revenue Gap
Problem, BLOGGING THE BOYS (Feb. 21, 2011, 7:01 AM), http://www
.bloggingtheboys.com/2011/2/21/2004505/nfl-lockout-2011-revenue-gap
-problem (identifying the rapid growth in revenue streams from licensing,
broadcasting through the League-owned NFL Network, and non-network television contracts with Comcast and DirecTV as particularly strong sources of
growth). See generally Clay Moorhead, Revenue Sharing and the Salary Cap in
the NFL: Perfecting the Balance Between NFL Socialism and Unrestrained
Free-Trade, 8 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 641, 642–60 (2006) (identifying the
origins of, massive growth behind, and modern challenges to the NFL revenue
sharing system).
27. Fortunado & Martin, supra note 14, at 74.
28. Am. Needle, 538 F.3d at 737.
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vendors simultaneously, including American Needle. While
total sales of apparel in the aggregate had reached $4 billion by
2000, the overall growth in sales of NFL products had started
30
to decline. Outside consultants identified the problem as a
glut of licensing agreements—leading to a glut of products—
and told the NFL that the appropriate response would be to en31
ter into exclusive licensing agreements.
In December 2000, the NFL teams authorized NFLP to so32
licit and grant exclusive licenses. The NFL subsequently
33
granted Electronic Arts an exclusive video game license,
34
granted Reebok an exclusive ten-year apparel license, and de35
clined to renew American Needle’s license. While litigation
challenging Electronic Arts’s exclusive license was only initiated relatively recently and is still slowly moving through the
36
courts, the challenge against Reebok was brought almost immediately. American Needle filed suit against the NFL, NFLP,
the individual NFL teams, and Reebok in federal district court
37
under Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act. The NFL defendants responded by filing a summary judgment motion arguing that since the teams and the League acted as a single entity, they could not be held liable under the Sherman Antitrust
38
Act. The district court held that the NFL was a single entity
39
and thus was not subject to liability under antitrust law.
B. THE ORIGINS OF THE SINGLE-ENTITY DEFENSE
The single-entity defense to the Sherman Antitrust Act
stems from the Supreme Court’s decision in Copperweld Corp.
40
v. Independence Tube Corp. In Copperweld, the Supreme
29. Id. at 737–38.
30. Terrell et al., supra note 25.
31. McCann, supra note 16, at 733 (identifying the consolidation decision
as originating with apparel merchandizing expert Chuck Zona).
32. Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat’l Football League, 130 S. Ct. 2201, 2207
(2010).
33. Pecover v. Elec. Arts Inc., 633 F. Supp. 2d 976, 978 (N.D. Cal. 2009).
34. Am. Needle, 130 S. Ct. at 2207.
35. Id.
36. Pecover, 633 F. Supp. 2d at 985 (denying the motion to dismiss in part
and allowing for class certification and discovery proceedings to begin).
37. Am. Needle Inc. v. Nat’l Football League, 538 F.3d 736, 738 (7th Cir.
2008), rev’d sub nom. Am. Needle, 130 S. Ct. at 2201.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 740–41.
40. McCann, supra note 16, at 742 (citing Ryan P. Meyers, Comment, Partial Ownership of Subsidiaries, Unity of Purpose, and Antitrust Liability, 68 U.
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Court determined that the coordinated activity of a parent
company and a wholly owned subsidiary should be viewed as
the action of a single entity instead of multiple competitive entities, and thus these companies cannot be liable under Section
41
1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act. This treatment stems from
two central premises. First, because the objectives of the parent
and its subsidiary are common and guided “not by two separate
consciousnesses, but one,” there cannot be any “agreement” in
42
Sherman Act terms. Second, determining whether antitrust
liability should apply is not a function of form, but is rather a
43
question of whether or not there is actual competition. The
Court rejected purely formalistic distinctions as counterproduc44
tive and harmful to consumer interests.
The Copperweld Court explicitly limited its holding to the
45
decisions of a corporation and its wholly owned subsidiary.
Federal courts in subsequent cases, however, have extended
the single-entity shield beyond a parent-subsidiary relationship
46
to affiliated companies and individuals. The most recent Supreme Court decision on the issue prior to American Needle,
Texaco, Inc. v. Dagher, suggests that the single-entity theory
could be applied beyond a strict parent-subsidiary relation47
ship. In Dagher, the Court considered an arrangement between Texaco and Shell to consolidate operations and jointly
share gains and losses for their operations in the western Unit48
ed States. In the face of a Sherman Act challenge, the Court
upheld the joint venture as a legitimate exercise of single-entity
CHI. L. REV. 1401, 1406 (2001)); see also Am. Needle, 538 F.3d at 738 (outlining the conclusion from Copperweld).
41. Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 771
(1984).
42. Id. The Court illustrated this concept through a metaphor of “a multiple team of horses drawing a vehicle under the control of a single driver.” Id.
43. Id. at 772–73.
44. Id. at 772–74.
45. McCann, supra note 16, at 744 (citing Copperweld, 467 U.S. at 767).
46. See, e.g., Jack Russell Terrier Network of N. Cal. v. Am. Kennel Club,
Inc., 407 F.3d 1027, 1035 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding lack of ownership of regional
affiliates irrelevant); Eleven Line, Inc. v. N. Tex. State Soccer Ass’n, 213 F.3d
198, 205 (5th Cir. 2000) (noting that in for-profit sports leagues, leagues and
teams share interest); Chi. Prof’l Sports Ltd. P’ship v. Nat’l Basketball Ass’n,
95 F.3d 593, 597–600 (7th Cir. 1996) (finding the NBA to be a single entity);
City of Mt. Pleasant v. Associated Elec. Coop., Inc., 838 F.2d 268, 271, 276–77
(8th Cir. 1988) (finding cooperative power grids not in competition).
47. 547 U.S. 1 (2006).
48. Id. at 4.
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49

status. Writing for the Court, Justice Thomas concluded that
once two separate partners entered into a joint venture, they
50
must be able to set their prices “like any other firm.” The
question for the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court in American Needle, therefore, was whether such
a theory should extend to the NFL in the licensing of its apparel.
C. THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT’S REASONING IN AMERICAN NEEDLE
In response to the seemingly clear-cut question of whether
or not to treat the NFL as a single entity, the Seventh Circuit
instead identified ways in which the NFL is arguably both a
single non-competitive entity and a combination of multiple
51
competitive entities. From the perspective of the fans, the
NFL is a single, entertainment-providing entity producing “one
52
product.” From the perspective of the player-employees, however, each team is an independent entity with the ability to
53
“hire and fire employees.” In light of the uncertainty involved
with various facets of the League operation, the Seventh Circuit focused their review on “the question of whether a professional sports league is a single entity . . . not only ‘one league at
54
a time,’ but also ‘one facet of a league at a time.’” Under this
standard, the Seventh Circuit limited its examination to the
organizational relationship between the NFL, the thirty-two
NFL teams, and the NFLP, and the business relationship between the NFL and its teams only insofar as they pertained to
the licensing of intellectual property (in this case, the licensing
55
of team apparel).
In examining the substantive economic effects of the licensing agreement rather than the labeling of the constituent parts,
the Seventh Circuit concluded that the NFL, through NFLP,
acted as one source of economic power in the licensing of its in-

49. Id. at 6.
50. Id. at 7.
51. Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat’l Football League, 538 F.3d 736, 741–44 (7th
Cir. 2008), rev’d sub nom. Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat’l Football League, 130 S. Ct.
2201 (2010).
52. Id. at 741 (quoting Chi. Prof’l Sports Ltd. P’ship v. Nat’l Basketball
Ass’n, 95 F.3d 593, 599 (7th Cir. 1996)).
53. Id. at 741–42 (citing Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 518 U.S. 231, 249
(1996)).
54. Id. at 742.
55. Id.
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tellectual property. The Seventh Circuit determined that
“American Needle’s proposed approach is one step removed
from saying that the NFL teams can be a single entity only if
the teams have ‘a complete unity of interest’—a legal proposi57
tion that we have rejected as ‘silly.’” Finding that no team can
produce a football game by itself and that “NFL teams are best
described as a single source of economic power when promoting
NFL football through licensing the teams’ intellectual property”
to compete against other forms of entertainment, Judge Kanne
held that the NFL must necessarily be exempt from liability
58
under either Section 1 or Section 2 of the Sherman Act.
D. THE SUPREME COURT’S REASONING IN AMERICAN NEEDLE
The Supreme Court’s decision in American Needle further
reduced the scope of inquiry down to one threshold question:
“whether the NFL respondents are capable of engaging in a
‘contract, combination . . . , or conspiracy’ as defined by § 1 of
59
the Sherman Act.” Justice Stevens began by identifying Congress’s intent to treat concerted action more strictly than independent behavior because of the high likelihood of anticompeti60
tive risk. Echoing the Seventh Circuit, Justice Stevens stated
that formalistic distinctions must be set aside in favor of functional considerations of how the parties involved actually be61
haved. The key distinction that needs to be ascertained under
this test, he wrote, is whether or not “separate economic actors
pursuing separate economic interests” have taken concerted ac62
tion.
Examining the actual use and licensing of intellectual
property under this framework, Justice Stevens concluded that
63
“teams compete in the market of intellectual property.” Because New Orleans Saints hats and Indianapolis Colts hats are
directly competitive products in the marketplace, each team
acts as a separate economic actor pursuing its own financial
56. Id. at 743.
57. Id. at 743 (citing Chi. Prof’l Sports Ltd. P’ship, 95 F.3d at 598).
58. Id. at 743–44.
59. Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat’l Football League, 130 S. Ct. 2201, 2208
(2010).
60. Id. at 2208–09.
61. Id. at 2209–10.
62. Id. at 2211–12 (quoting Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube
Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 767 (1984)).
63. Id. at 2213.
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gain in the marketplace. In response to the Seventh Circuit’s
argument that a team cannot produce a football game by itself,
Justice Stevens retorted that while “two teams are needed to
play a football game, not all aspects of elaborate interleague co65
operation are necessary to produce a game.” In response to the
Seventh Circuit’s argument that the League is a functional single economic actor, Justice Stevens responded that “teams remain separately controlled, potential competitors with economic interests that are distinct from NFLP’s financial well66
being.” Justice Stevens concluded that so long as teams are
separately owned economic actors, they cannot be seen as part
67
of a single entity.
Justice Stevens’s most interesting analysis, however, came
in Part VI of his opinion. While he ultimately concluded that
antitrust law was generally applicable, Justice Stevens drew an
area of exception around “[t]he fact that NFL teams share an
interest in making the entire league successful and profitable,
and that they must cooperate in the production and scheduling
68
of games.” Justice Stevens also argued that the attempt to
achieve competitive balance is a legitimate goal that professional sports leagues like the NFL have a special interest in
69
achieving. Because Stevens determined that NFL teams were
capable of collectively violating Section 1 of the Sherman Act,
however, the Court rejected the single-entity defense and instead required an analysis of the licensing arrangement under
70
the Rule of Reason. Subsequently, Stevens remanded the case
71
for consideration on those grounds. The Rule of Reason requires courts to evaluate whether a restraint promotes or destroys competition by “the facts peculiar to the business to
which the restraint is applied; its condition before and after the
restraint is imposed; the nature of the restraint and its effect,
72
actual or probable.” While Stevens concluded at the very end
of the decision that there is no basis for single-entity status to
64. Id.
65. Id. at 2214 n.7.
66. Id. at 2215.
67. Id. at 2215–16.
68. Id. at 2216.
69. Id. at 2217 (citing Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents of
Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85 (1984)).
70. Id. at 2216.
71. Id. at 2217.
72. Id. at 2217 n.10 (quoting Bd. of Trade of Chi. v. United States, 246
U.S. 231, 238 (1918)).
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be granted to collective licenses of league intellectual property
73
specifically, he potentially left an opening for a distinction to
be drawn and limited single-entity protection to be established
for some forms of collective activity. Part II of this Note will examine the difficulties of applying strict Rule of Reason liability
to professional sports leagues, specifically in the context of the
licensing of the NFL as a whole in video games.
II. THE LIMITATIONS AND LIABILITIES OF DENYING
PROFESSIONAL SPORTS LEAGUES THE ABILITY TO
EXCLUSIVELY LICENSE THEIR OWN INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY
While a broad extension of the American Needle decision
would have an effect on the NFL’s business model across the
board and on antitrust law more generally, attempting to describe all conceivable consequences of such an extension would
result in a shallow, surface-level analysis. As a result, this Note
examines the consequences of entirely precluding the singleentity argument by focusing on the League’s exclusive licensing
agreement with Electronic Arts. This Part begins with a discussion of the economics of collective licensing and the threat
that the American Needle framework poses to both consumers’
marketplace options and to the League’s ability to license itself
as a whole. It then analyzes the Electronic Arts agreement under the Rule of Reason. This Part concludes by identifying the
likely impacts to eliminating the exclusive licensing agreement,
both in terms of broader non-compliance and competitive effects throughout the League.
A. THE NFL AND CONSUMERS’ INTERESTS IN COLLECTIVE
LICENSING
Sports video games, especially football video games, have
generally succeeded or failed based on the strength of the li74
cense behind them. Games that have attempted to compete
with Electronic Arts on its own terms, by providing realistically
recreated on-field action and employing former NFL legends,
73. Id. at 2217.
74. See Chad Lakkis, EA Exclusive NFL License Undone? Sports Antitrust
Law Professor Explains American Needle Impact, RIPTEN (May 28, 2010, 6:36
PM),
http://www.ripten.com/2010/05/28/sports-antitrust-law-professor
-explains-american-needle-verdict-impact-on-eas-exclusive-nfl-licensingagreement (explaining that the broad trend in sports video game sales suggests the license is the most important indicator of commercial success).
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have not been able to compete with the Madden franchise.
Even video games that attempted to reject the NFL’s realism
and instead focused on the seamier, more violent, or more absurd aspects of the sport were unable to compete with Madden
76
absent the NFL license. As a consequence, the only way to
create a viable football simulation is to arrange a licensing
agreement that includes every team and recreates the League
77
as a whole. In a world where the League cannot license itself
holistically because of a strict application of the American Needle rule, individual teams or divisions could splinter off to create their own rival games, creating a balkanized, fractured
78
marketplace. While it is possible that all thirty-two NFL
teams would separately negotiate agreements with Electronic
Arts, such a unified effort seems unlikely in light of previous
attempts by owners to defy the will of the League, especially
because teams would be likely to acquire strong financial bene79
fits over the long term.
Instead of entering into exclusive licensing agreements, the
NFL could instead adopt non-exclusive collective licensing
agreements that allow teams to license themselves to multiple
competing game producers. Pre-existing exclusive licenses
granted by the NFL, including the Electronic Arts agreement
through 2014, render any new licensing structures impossible
80
in the short term. Additionally, the expenses involved with licensing have functionally limited every major sport to one li-

75. Id.
76. Id.
77. See Brief for Electronic Arts, Inc. as Amicus Curiae Supporting the
NFL Respondents, supra note 18, at 15 (arguing that companies pursuing an
exclusivity agreement need to know if they are “buying a license or an antitrust lawsuit”).
78. Supreme Court Rules Against NFL Being Single Entity, PASTAPADRE
(May 24, 2010, 12:36 PM), http://www.pastapadre.com/2010/05/24/supreme
-court-rules-against-nfl-being-single-entity (arguing that large market teams
or even NFL divisions could license themselves to create competing titles).
While it is arguable whether these titles would be broadly successful, experience in other sports illustrates that this sort of balkanization could happen.
See infra note 119 and accompanying text.
79. See, e.g., L.A. Mem’l Coliseum Comm’n v. Nat’l Football League, 726
F.2d 1381, 1384–86, 1390 (9th Cir. 1984) (upholding a challenge by owner Al
Davis attempting to move his football team to Los Angeles); Dall. Cowboys
Football Club, Ltd. v. Nat’l Football League Trust, No. 95-9426, 1996 WL
601705 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 18, 1996) (involving claims by the Dallas Cowboys challenging the NFLP’s licensing agreement).
80. See Hruby, supra note 1.
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censed provider, seemingly necessitating exclusivity. Even if
these factors change over the long term, however, such nonexclusive agreements would largely eliminate the appeal for a
company to sign a licensing agreement at all, because the value
82
of the license lies in both its exclusivity and its completeness.
Especially in the context of football, having the ability to exclusively license all the rights to the League is essential to having
83
a viable product. Further, there is no logical end-point to the
process of removing licensing authority—teams, players, coaches, and stadium owners all could lose their collectively licensed
status and have to be courted, negotiated with, and signed in84
dividually. Such a move would not only deter video game developers from pursuing a license to create a similar game in the
future, but it would likely render the attempt to make one fi85
nancially infeasible—football video gaming’s nuclear winter.
The loss of the ability to effectively license the NFL would put
both the video game market in jeopardy and the League itself
86
into worse financial straits. Regardless of potential theoretical
81. See Owen Good, You Can Have Any Sports Video Game You Want, But
There’s Only One, KOTAKU (May 28, 2011, 8:00 PM), http://kotaku.com/
5806547/you-can-have-any-sports-video-game-you-want-but-theres-only-one
(identifying the existence of one major sports title apiece for the NFL, NBA,
NHL, FIFA soccer, NASCAR, UFC, and functionally for the MLB).
82. See Brief for Electronic Arts, Inc. as Amici Curiae Supporting the NFL
Respondents, supra note 18, at 10–11 (arguing that exclusive blanket licensing
agreements are often necessary to create a new product).
83. See Lakkis, supra note 74 and accompanying text.
84. To a certain extent, this has already happened with certain superstars
including Michael Jordan and Barry Bonds “opting out” of collective licensing
by their player associations. See, e.g., Darren Rovell, Bonds Will Be Individually Licensed, ESPN.COM (Nov. 17, 2003, 12:09 AM), http://sports.espn.go.com/
mlb/news/story?id=1661883 (illustrating an interest in some superstar athletes to test the market and make more money through individual endorsement deals).
85. See Brief for Electronic Arts, Inc. as Amici Curiae Supporting the NFL
Respondents, supra note 18, at 9 (arguing that Electronic Arts could not feasibly create a licensed NFL game without some ability to corral rights for players, coaches, teams, stadiums, and other essential components of the game experience).
86. Id. at 10–12. While it could be argued that the success of the NCAA
video game diminishes the importance of player names and likenesses, this
argument is a nonstarter because the NCAA has a similar exclusive licensing
agreement for all the teams and conferences, and puts the likenesses of players into the game surreptitiously. See, e.g., Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 808 F.
Supp. 2d 757, 760–66 (D.N.J. 2011) (describing and ultimately upholding Electronic Arts’s practices in creating a collegiate football game that, despite only
identifying players by numbers, uses the actual biographical and physical information provided in team media guides); Good, supra note 81 (illustrating
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alternatives, the NFL’s existing licensing agreements and desire to reach mutually beneficial terms with licensing partners
functionally mandate that League intellectual property will
continue to be licensed exclusively.
The real losers, in either the balkanization example or the
nuclear-winter example, are the consumers who watch the NFL
and purchase the video games in question. If a football fan
wants to virtually recreate a matchup they saw in their living
room the week before, they may no longer be able to because
those teams don’t even occupy the same game. As well-known
game sector analyst Michael Pachter argues, “Having each
team negotiate the terms of a video game license would mean
that there could be 32 separate games, and that potentially, on87
ly one team would appear in each.” A fragmented marketplace
is the worst possible consumer environment, as it fills the marketplace with a glut of inferior products and risks gradually
88
eliminating the incentive to create any new titles.
While many readers may not consider the ability of consumers to play the games of their choice as a viable harm, it is
impossible to discount the role that the creation of video games
(in particular, sports video games) have on the U.S. economy.
Video game sales are a critical and growing economic sector,
89
with $25.1 billion in sales of video games in 2010. Sports
games made up 16.3% of that market, comprising a total mar90
ket share of nearly $4.1 billion dollars in sales annually. As
Texas Representative Kevin Brady has noted, the video game
industry “has generated more than 120,000 jobs in over 34
91
states and is a major international player as well.” Absent the
viability of video games like Electronic Arts’s Madden fran-

how Electronic Arts is the sole owner of the NCAA’s intellectual property).
87. Owen Good, What the NFL Antitrust Ruling Might Mean for Madden,
KOTAKU (May 24, 2010, 6:20 PM), http://kotaku.com/5546408/what-the-nfl
-antitrust-ruling-might-mean-for-madden.
88. This is not a purely hypothetical situation either. See Owen Good, Will
We Have Any Baseball Video Game on Xbox 360 Next Year?, KOTAKU (Apr. 21,
2012, 7:30 PM), http://kotaku.com/5904056/will-we-have-any-baseball-video
-game-on-the-xbox-360-next-year (identifying how license proliferation has
segmented the market, leaving an entire gaming console without any baseball
simulation).
89. ESSENTIAL FACTS ABOUT THE COMPUTER AND VIDEO GAME INDUSTRY,
2011 SALES, DEMOGRAPHICS AND USAGE DATA, ENT. SOFTWARE ASS’N 11
(2011), available at http://www.theesa.com/facts/pdfs/ESA_EF_2011.pdf.
90. Id. at 8.
91. Id. at 11.
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chise, the video games market could see an immediate and sig92
nificant decline.
The main argument that opponents of license exclusivity
advance to dispute that Electronic Arts’s license is good for the
marketplace and consumers is that the exclusive licensing arrangement and subsequent lack of competition has driven up
93
prices. A University of Michigan economics professor estimated that the amount Electronic Arts has overcharged consumers
94
ranges from $701 to $926 million. Michael Pachter, however,
95
hotly disputes this figure. First, Pachter argues that the calculation does not appear to be based on actual sales during the
period of exclusivity, which he calculates to have added approx96
imately $1.18 to the total cost of the product. Second, Pachter
argues that the comparison itself is flawed because Electronic
Arts’s main competitor at the time, Take-Two Interactive, purposefully discounted its product below cost and ended up hurt97
ing themselves in the bargain. Finally, Pachter argues that
because all other video games exclusively license their intellectual property, it is disingenuous to claim that there is a right to
98
a non-exclusive sports licensing agreement. In any case, the
economics of the situation face a drastic potential change in
light of the American Needle decision, a licensing arrangement
that may end up being counterproductive for consumers if challenged and discarded as a part of the Court’s Rule of Reason
analysis.

92. See id. at 9 (identifying Madden NFL 11 as the number two video
game in the world in terms of units sold in 2010). See also Rachel Metz, Late
‘Madden’ Saps August Video Game Sales, CNS NEWS (Sept. 8, 2011), http://
cnsnews.com/news/article/late-madden-saps-august-video-game-sales (arguing
that a slight delay in the release of Madden NFL 12 in August 2011 caused a
significant decline in video game sales for the month).
93. Economist: EA’s Madden Monopoly Cost Gamers up to $926 Million,
GAMEPOLITICS (July 14, 2009), http://www.gamepolitics.com/2009/07/14/
economist-ea039s-madden-monopoly-cost-gamers-926-million.
94. Id.
95. Pachter: Economist’s Claims in Madden Monopoly Case Irresponsible,
GAMEPOLITICS (July 15, 2009), http://www.gamepolitics.com/2009/07/15/
pachter-economist039s-claims-madden-monopoly-case-irresponsible.
96. Id. This constitutes a tiny fraction of McKie-Mason’s estimate of consumer damages.
97. Id.
98. Id.
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B. RULE OF REASON ANALYSIS THREATENS EXCLUSIVE VIDEO
GAME LICENSING
Part VI of Justice Stevens’s American Needle opinion observes that a broad reading of the Rule of Reason will uphold
99
most NFL agreements. A related concern arises however—
what about arrangements that presumptively would not meet
the Rule of Reason? There are reasons to believe the relative
market share of Electronic Arts, combined with its use of exclusive licensing agreements like the NFL agreement, could pose a
100
problem under the standard. The primary issue for Electronic
Arts is the sheer number of exclusive licensing and publishing
agreements it owns, which have secured “four different profes101
sional leagues, an entire player’s union, and a media giant.”
Further, Electronic Arts has nearly locked up the football license market in its entirety, exclusively licensing collegiate
102
football and the Arena Football League. In sports gaming,
Electronic Arts holds 63% of all sports licenses, a prohibitive
103
command of the market. All of these factors suggest that
Electronic Arts may have the market share to be considered a
104
monopoly that could be broken up under antitrust law. Under
a Rule of Reason analysis, an organization with monopoly power and that uses that power in a predatory way will generally
105
be struck down.
On the other hand, however, condensing licenses into the
hands of one game producer, in this case Electronic Arts, may
lead to efficiencies that justify the NFL’s choice to pick a single
106
licensee. The Rule of Reason would require the NFL to provide reason why their licensing agreement is reasonably pro107
competitive instead of anti-competitive. Electronic Arts pro99. Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat’l Football League, 130 S. Ct. 2201, 2217 (2010)
(citing Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468
U.S. 85, 109 n.39 (1984)) (holding that the Rule of Reason can “sometimes be
applied in the twinkling of an eye”).
100. Liron Offir, Monopolistic Sleeper: How the Video Gaming Industry
Awoke to Realize that Electronic Arts Was Already in Charge, 8 DUQ. BUS. L.J.
91, 115 (2006).
101. Id. at 99 (referring to NCAA football, the Arena Football League, the
NFL, FIFA soccer, the NFL Players Association, and ESPN).
102. Id. at 99–102.
103. Id. at 113.
104. Id. at 115.
105. Lonny S. Hoffman, Harmar and the Ever-Expanding Scope of Legal
Sufficiency Review, 49 S. TEX. L. REV. 611, 616 (2008).
106. Masteralexis, supra note 13.
107. Id.
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vided a number of reasons why their activity is pro-competitive
in their brief to the American Needle Court: decreased transaction costs due to streamlined relations between the NFL and
108
Electronic Arts, the ability to effectively manage and main109
tain the high quality of their brand, and the substantial in110
novation effects of having a year-to-year developer.
Even if the NFL’s exclusive licensing agreement with Electronic Arts does not meet the standards for the Rule of Reason
established in Board of Trade of Chicago v. United States con111
cerning monopolistic behavior, the Court should exempt this
specific instance because of both the unique requirements of
112
collective and exclusive licensing in sports video games, and
the special competitive purpose protected under the deferential
posture the Court has taken regarding sports in its previous ju113
risprudence. Despite Justice Stevens’s claim that under Rule
of Reason analysis, approval for such programs can often be
done “in the twinkling of an eye,” the near-monopoly held by
Electronic Arts makes it highly doubtful that sports gaming
114
would receive such a cursory examination. As will be illustrated in the next Part, the potential effects of anti-competitive
behavior within the League have such deleterious consequences
that it is preferable overall to treat the licensing arrangement
as an acceptable single-entity practice.
C. ANTI-COMPETITIVE IMPACTS OF A STRICT APPLICATION OF
AMERICAN NEEDLE ON THE LEAGUE
Justice Stevens took caution to emphasize the critical interests the NFL has in promoting competitive balance across
115
the League’s teams.
The inherent potential for anticompetitive behavior in the application of each level of collective licensing failure, however, is nothing short of alarming.
108. See Brief for Electronic Arts, Inc. as Amici Curiae Supporting the NFL
Respondents, supra note 18, at 14 (arguing that working exclusively with the
NFL allowed for a “substantial lowering of costs” which could be passed on to
consumers).
109. Id. at 12.
110. Masteralexis, supra note 13.
111. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
112. See supra notes 81–86 and accompanying text.
113. See supra notes 68–69 and accompanying text.
114. Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat’l Football League, 130 S. Ct. 2201, 2208 (2010)
(citing Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468
U.S. 85 (1984)).
115. See supra notes 68–69 and accompanying text.

2013

NFL LICENSING AGREEMENTS

2369

First, should the collective licensing marketplace fail, the entire League would be deprived of substantial amounts of money
that are shared evenly among the thirty-two NFL teams. Not
only is this money important, but it is the single-fastest growing sector of the NFL economy, and teams will be driven to cap116
ture this money with or without the League. As teams increasingly pursue maximization of local revenue streams that
are not part of the revenue sharing system (including stadium
117
profits and local licenses), the core aspects of revenue sharing
(in this case, the ability of the league to license itself) becomes
extremely important to encouraging league-wide competitive
balance. Because this shared money is generally enough to pay
for the entirety of a team’s salary expenses, striking a blow
against the system of revenue sharing threatens competitive
118
balance across the League.
Second, the problems of holdout markets and noncompliant teams will only be exacerbated in a world where differential licensing allows for some teams to strike preferential
119
deals while others are left without. Huge disparities in revenue streams between have and have-not teams are already be120
ginning to develop. Any move towards preferential licensing
of large-market team intellectual property will only serve to
exacerbate the financial differences between large-market
teams, which may be able to support themselves independently
or at the very least strike a much more favorable financial deal,
and small-market teams, which will likely be left in the
121
lurch. This risks the development of economics similar to

116. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
117. See Moorhead, supra note 26, at 660–64 (arguing that teams are doing
everything in their power to maximize the profits they can gain from local fees
including tertiary licensing, ticketing, and parking fees).
118. See id. at 669–71 (arguing that the NFL’s extreme competitive parity
across all teams in the League is a direct result of the broad system of revenue
sharing).
119. The licensing of soccer video games provides an excellent example of
this phenomenon, as individual clubs often sign licenses away from their
leagues and cause a conflicting mishmash of real and fake players, clubs, and
leagues. See Prarthito Maity, FIFA 12 Vs Pro Evolution Soccer 12 - A Review
(Videos), INT’L BUS. TIMES, Nov. 15, 2011, available at http://m.ibtimes.com/
fifa-12-vs-pro-evolution-soccer-review-249473.html.
120. Moorhead, supra note 26, at 666–68.
121. An easy analogy can be made to the creation of regional sports networks, which have given big market teams in baseball access to millions or
even billions of dollars more than their rivals. See Richard Sandomir, Regional
Sports Networks Show the Money, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 20, 2011, at D1.
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baseball, where the large markets can easily dominate because
122
of their built-in financial advantages.
Finally, even with the NFL’s hard salary cap, which limits
the total salary each team may pay to all of its players, there
are still substantial benefits that can and will accrue to teams
123
with more money. While teams are limited in the number of
players they can have on their roster and the total amount of
money they can pay them, they have unlimited discretion to
124
spend their money on tertiary benefits to those players. Generally speaking, teams with the highest paid coaches and high125
er quality facilities tend to win more often.
Additionally,
through the use of prorated bonuses, teams can spend well
126
above the salary cap if they have the means to do so. The
consequence of this is that a salary cap system designed to give
smaller markets a better chance to compete has in many ways
become a force that harms small-market teams, which have
127
less room to make mistakes. Because the salary cap system
alone is not enough to protect the interests of small-market
teams, collective licensing of the League is necessary to maintain competitive balance across the NFL.
This seemingly anti-competitive effect is arguably just the
outgrowth of the fact that sports teams are nothing more than
corporate entities competing in a tightly regulated form of capitalism. This argument, however, ignores years of Court precedent identifying sports as categorically different under the
122. While small-market teams in baseball can compete by exploiting undervalued assets, having a large-market team represents the easiest path to
continued success. See generally MICHAEL LEWIS, MONEYBALL: THE ART OF
WINNING AN UNFAIR GAME (2004).
123. See generally Al Lackner, NFL Salary Cap FAQ, ASKTHECOMMISH
.COM (Aug. 29, 2011), http://www.askthecommish.com/salarycap/faq.asp (illustrating the rules of the NFL’s salary cap and how it functions to create yearto-year spending parity).
124. Id.
125. See Eric Ostermeier, Will a New Stadium Make the Minnesota Vikings
a More Successful Franchise?, SMART POL. (Dec. 1, 2009), http://blog.lib.umn
.edu/cspg/smartpolitics/2009/12/will_a_new_stadium_make_the_mi.php
(demonstrating a statistical correlation between new stadiums and subsequent team success); Tom Van Riper, The Highest-Paid NFL Coaches, FORBES
(Jan. 4, 2011, 6:00 PM), http://www.forbes.com/2011/01/04/patriots-redskins
-seahawks-business-sports-nfl-highest-paid-coaches.html (arguing that there
is a statistical correlation between coach pay and overall success).
126. See Moorhead, supra note 26, at 671–72 (arguing that teams with the
means often use financial tricks to put the actual cost of a contract well off into the future).
127. Id. at 670–71.
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128

law. Even beyond what the Court has stated, however, it is
difficult to see why courts should apply the Sherman Act, a
piece of legislation aimed at stopping the destructive excesses
of restraints on trade, in such a way that would be broadly de129
structive to League competitive interests. A better compromise, as identified in Part III, is to judge whether the agreement licenses the League as a whole, and is pro-competitive, or
if it licenses individual team intellectual property collectively,
and is anti-competitive.
III. THE SELF-LICENSING EXEMPTION: LIMITED
SINGLE-ENTITY STATUS FOR SPORTS LEAGUES
LICENSING THEMSELVES AS A WHOLE
As illustrated above, applying a Rule of Reason analysis to
the licensing of League intellectual property will result in less
efficiency, less competition within the League itself, and direct
130
harm to the consumer and the marketplace. Consequently,
this Part proposes an exemption to the general rule in American Needle allowing single-entity treatment where a professional sports league acts to license its own intellectual property
while disallowing single-entity treatment as it applies to individual team intellectual property bundled and licensed collectively.
A. COURTS SHOULD EXAMINE CHALLENGES TO LICENSING
ARRANGEMENTS BY FOCUSING ON WHETHER A COMPETITIVE
WHOLE OR ITS CONSTITUENT PARTS HAVE BEEN LICENSED
This Part proposes a Court-imposed exemption to the general rule in American Needle that differentiates between licensing agreements that collectively license individual team intellectual property that has been bundled together and those
agreements that license the intellectual property of the League
as a whole. First, this Part argues that the rule in American
Needle should continue to be applied in cases where directly
competitive products are licensed together. Second, this Part
argues that where the intellectual property being licensed represents the League as a holistic entity, such licensing agreements should be upheld against Sherman Act challenges under
the Court’s single-entity precedent.
128. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
129. Sherman Antitrust Act § 1, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006).
130. See supra Part II.
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1. The American Needle Rule Should Be Retained and
Sherman Act Liability Should Apply to Separable Team
Intellectual Property
While the application of the principles of American Needle
too broadly beyond the facts of the case is unnecessary, on its
own merits the decision is entirely defensible. When teams license their individual intellectual property through a collective
entity, it precludes directly competitive market goods from en131
tering the marketplace. With logos on a hat, the Colts and
132
Saints do directly compete in a marketplace. In a similar
fashion, attempts by the League to manage or pool the profits
from individual team initiatives like fan promotions, facility
and stadium use, and player appearances would facially violate
this standard, because they would regulate a team from promoting itself versus other competing teams. Similarly, agreements that purport to license the League as a whole but instead merely grant the licensee the authority to recreate,
reproduce, or otherwise duplicate the indicia of the various
NFL teams would facially violate the standard because the license does not have to be employed in a collective fashion. So
long as what is being promoted is the team itself, independent
of its role in the League in a holistic competitive sense, the
NFL has no authority to regulate how a team may promote and
sell its intellectual property.
2. Single-Entity Status Should Be Granted When the League
Licenses Itself as a Collective Entity
In contrast to situations where the thirty-two NFL teams
take action outside of the competitive league framework in an
attempt to promote their individual interests, instances where
the League licenses itself as a holistic entity should not be understood to violate the Sherman Antitrust Act. In instances like
the exclusive licensing agreement with Electronic Arts, or for
that matter the League’s licensing of their “NFL Network” to
cable and satellite companies, the League is licensing its own
intellectual property centered on the concept of the League as a
whole. One possible way in which the League could conceivably
license itself is by hiring a company to create and display computer simulations of upcoming games. As the simulations
would lack any independent meaning outside of the schedule,
131. See supra Part I.D.
132. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
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rules, and competitive structure of the NFL, arguing that this
represents a collective license of team intellectual property rather than a single license of the League itself is simply incorrect. Lacking any true economic competition between teams
within the League, these examples cannot be said to be any
sort of bundled intellectual property of particular constituent
teams or individuals. As a result, and in order to promote the
competitive balance of small- and large-market teams through
revenue sharing agreements, these agreements should be identified as clear single-entity licenses that are exempted from
American Needle and immune from Sherman Act liability.
There are a number of reasons to prefer this understanding
of the League as a single entity when it acts holistically. First,
the League is promoting itself as a cohesive entity rather than
a series of loosely joined but ultimately competitive entities.
From the perspective of individual teams, there is clearly no
competition between teams, because despite separate ownership they have no value independent of each other—a single
133
team with no one to play attracts no fans. From the perspective of the League as a whole, the fact that teams share nearly
all revenue with each other and the only revenue that is not
shared is largely local revenue with minimal competitive overlap suggests that there is no actual competition between
134
teams. Second, even if it is true that an individual football
game is a competitive event, the seasonal league schedule culminating in the Super Bowl literally cannot occur without a
concerted effort where individual teams are subordinated to the
135
League. Finally, in instances where the League licenses itself
as a league, it is acting as a structural unit and it reaps competitive, economic and structural benefits by acting as a single
136
entity as opposed to a collection of thirty-two teams. In the
specific instance of licensing the NFL to Electronic Arts, the license in large part relies on having the corporate authority to
license the League as a whole and the fact that the League is
137
the center of the license. It is important to distinguish these
micro- and macro-level arguments from the argument in Amer133. McCann, supra note 16, at 751–52.
134. Grow, supra note 24, at 490–91.
135. Id. at 488.
136. See McCann, supra note 16, at 751.
137. See supra Part II.A. Electronic Arts licenses a lot more than the
teams, including the League schedule, the draft and free agency rules and procedures, real life contracts and contract rules, etc.
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ican Needle that teams are necessarily in economic competition
with one another over the sale of their distinct intellectual
138
property. While the thirty-two teams to a certain extent subordinate their interests to the NFL on league-wide issues, doing
so does not preclude them from licensing their individual intellectual property in separate agreements. These arguments
merely conclude that because there are interests that can only
be represented by the NFL as a holistic entity, those interests
should be licensable by a single entity.
Opponents to this approach make a few primary arguments for why professional sports leagues cannot ever be single
entities. One author contends that there are too many residual
bundles of property rights held by teams for them to have a
complete unity of interest, including “(1) individual gate receipts (including other stadium revenues); (2) corporate proceeds; (3) broadcast revenues; (4) licensing/merchandising fees;
139
and (5) Internet/new media revenues.” In this specific case of
140
the NFL, however, all of these financial interests are shared.
The only real remaining question is whether or not finances
need to be completely shared between individual agents in such
a joint venture. Based on the Court’s decision in Texaco, Inc. v.
Dagher, however, there is no requirement that firms need to
share all of their profits or even all of their interests across all
141
aspects of their corporate identity. Additionally, the bundled
property rights standard argued for here would only allow fully
owned subsidiaries and a parent company to be considered a
single entity, a theory which would gut the fundamental underpinnings of Copperweld by placing a number of parentsubsidiary relationships outside of a single-entity defense (at
142
least where some market competition exists). In any case, the
distinction argued for in this Note allows collective licensing
only in situations where the League is acting as a collective entity, which still allows teams to exercise their rights over local
revenues and nullifies the entirety of this property rights concern.
138. Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat’l Football League, 130 S. Ct. 2201, 2213
(2010).
139. Marc Edelman, Why the “Single Entity” Defense Can Never Apply to
NFL Clubs: A Primer on Property-Rights Theory in Professional Sports, 18
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 891, 925 (2008).
140. Grow, supra note 24, at 490–91.
141. See Texaco, Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U.S. 1, 6 (2006).
142. See Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 771
(1984); see also supra note 45 and accompanying text.
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A second argument against single-entity status is that
there are major differences between teams, including differences between large- and small-market owners, debt-bearing
and non-debt-bearing owners, and among factions who emerge
143
While these
in the selection of a League Commissioner.
groupings of owners suggest that there could be differences of
opinion on the direction of the League, they don’t demonstrate
any reason why the League itself cannot be theorized as a distinct entity. If anything, this objection could be used as evidence to substantiate the bright-line distinction drawn in this
Note—if there is a substantial disagreement among owners, the
League likely is not licensing its own intellectual property, but
is rather licensing the intellectual property of different teams
in ways the teams disagree on.
A third argument against single-entity status challenges
the notion that the NFL exists as a distinct legal entity when,
at heart, independent and competitive entities comprise the
144
League. According to this analysis, any cartel could claim
that they were acting through a distinct central authority and
145
generally evade antitrust law. This argument, however, ignores the fact that in American Needle, the Court clearly illustrated that some aspects of the League operation (including actions taken by the central league entity to maintain competitive
balance) represented a legitimate and important central inter146
est exercised by the League itself. The Court, however, only
affirmatively established scheduling, rules of play, and admin147
istrative guidelines as necessary for League operation. What
the Court distinguished at the end of its decision were attempts
to collective license teams’ “individually owned intellectual
property,” which it argued demanded a refusal of single-entity
148
treatment. In cases where what is being licensed is the NFL
as a whole rather than the intellectual property of its various
teams, however, these arguments lose much of their salience
because the licensed good itself could not exist without the existence of a central League operation. Even under a test requir143. McCann, supra note 16, at 760–62.
144. Meir Feder, Is There Life After Death for Sports League Immunity?
American Needle and Beyond, 18 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 407, 422 (2011).
145. Id.
146. Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat’l Football League, 130 S. Ct. 2201, 2217 (2010)
(citing Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Assn. v. Bd. Of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468
U.S. 85, 117 (1984)).
147. Id.
148. Id.
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ing that subsidiaries always be “incapable of independent action,” the Court could determine that the NFL (when licensing
itself as a whole) could be understood as a single operating
149
unit, and thus as a single entity.
A final argument against single-entity status contends that
from a public policy perspective, since the unique structure of
the NFL is the basis of each individual team’s profitability,
there is no basis to give teams an exemption to antitrust rules
150
as well. This argument, however, assumes that teams are
able to benefit from half participation in collective licensing arrangements like the one the League concluded with Reebok in
American Needle. The bright-line rule proposed in this Note
would eliminate that issue by turning the focus of a court’s inquiry onto whether the licensing arrangement was the NFL itself licensing the League as a single, collective entity. Additionally, this argument attempts to reject a defensible bright-line
rule in order to make a larger economic point. Simply because
the teams would get an economic benefit from a consistent application of the rules of single-entity to individual teams and to
the League as a whole is not a good reason to reject an otherwise logical and legally consistent framework of analysis.
Understanding the League as a single entity when it licenses itself as a whole is the only way to sensibly reconcile the
fact that the League is both a collection of the thirty-two teams
that comprise it and something more. When all of the interests,
the scheduling, and the very competition between teams is
what is at issue, the NFL clearly acts as a single entity and
should be treated as one under the Sherman Antitrust Act.
B. THE COURTS, NOT CONGRESS, SHOULD IMPLEMENT THIS
TEST
Michael McCann, in a prospective article on the American
Needle decision, concludes that because the Court has failed to
fashion a bright-line rule, Congress should step in and legislate
exemptions to the general prohibition against single-entity
151
treatment of the NFL and other sports organizations. Such
exemptions could protect both the Court’s attempt to draw a
149. Feder, supra note 144, at 422.
150. Camalla M. Kimbrough, Upon Further Review: How the NFL’s Exclusive Licensing Agreement with Reebok Survives Antitrust Scrutiny Despite the
League’s Flawed Single-Entity Defense, 13 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 235,
247 (2010).
151. McCann, supra note 16, at 779–80.
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clear line against collusive activity hidden behind a shell company as well as the individual interests of professional sports
152
leagues. Additionally, such an approach would comport with
past legislative attempts to balance the interests of antitrust
153
law and professional sports leagues.
While McCann’s argument seems compelling on its face, it
falls into a couple of traps that suggest leaving the interpretation to the courts. First, as McCann acknowledges, putting the
decision in the hands of Congress opens the field up to the
League’s “government relations specialists, influential lobbyists, and political action committees, [who] are well-positioned
to exert disproportionate influence on congressional
154
decisionmaking.” Once the NFL begins to exert control over
congressional levers on this issue, it would likely spill past the
reasonable line suggested here and extend the League’s authority to collective regulation of individual team licensing and be155
yond.
Such influence would eliminate the entire jurisprudence that has developed around sports leagues and antitrust,
and could ostensibly even give League authorities leverage in
undercutting the bargaining position of players or immunize
the League from liability for major harms stemming from the
game of football itself. Second, as McCann once again notes, allowing the NFL to change antitrust rules could prime the pump
for exemptions for other businesses, gradually wearing away at
156
the foundation of antitrust law. The competitive interests to
be protected in creating a balanced league do not and should
not apply to businesses generally, which exist in a mostly unregulated market (as opposed to the closed competitive entity
that is the NFL) and need the checks and balances provided by
the Sherman Act. Finally, the courts will inevitably have to resolve whatever antitrust exemptions Congress creates, and it
seems institutionally wasteful for the Court to interpret an act
152. Id. at 780.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. See Jed Hughes, NFL Leads All Sports Leagues in Government Lobbying and Political Involvement, BLEACHER REP. (June 1, 2012), http://
bleacherreport.com/articles/1204804-nfl-leads-all-sports-leagues-in-lobbyingand-political-involvement (citing a survey by First Street Research Group estimating 2011 lobbying expenditures for the NFL on issues including broadcasting rights, Internet gambling, drug testing, and player safety at
$1,620,000, which is more than the next three highest spending leagues combined).
156. McCann, supra note 16, at 780–81.
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of Congress when it could merely create an exemption of its
own accord. McCann’s “institutional advantages” and “more ca157
pable record” of Congress are not clear in a world where the
courts are and will remain the primary arbiter of antitrust law
in the United States, and can delineate a specific exemption
with minimal fuss.
While a congressional version of the solution proposed in
this Note would likely fix much of the problem this Note has
identified, the risk of negative spillover effects from lobbying
counsel against such a solution. Both the risk to the competitive marketplace in individual team intellectual property and
the overall status of antitrust law as applied to other business
interests suggest that the Court should create such a rule within its own limited and arguably special sports jurisprudence.
CONCLUSION
In American Needle, the Supreme Court was asked to determine whether thirty-two NFL teams, each licensing their
individual and directly competitive intellectual property, could
be considered a single entity for the purposes of collective licensing. The Court was well within both its jurisprudential
bounds and the realm of common sense in striking down such
an attempt to escape antitrust liability.
At the same time, however, this decision should not be read
in such a way to completely eliminate the League’s ability to be
treated as a single economic actor when licensing its collective
intellectual property as a competitive sports enterprise. Such
an attempt to throw the baby out with the bathwater would not
only risk balkanization of the League in its licensing agreements and anti-competitive fiscal distributions, but it would also risk the very existence of pro-consumer products such as indepth, fully licensed video games. By acknowledging the distinction between the teams that comprise the NFL and the
NFL itself, courts can create a rule that fairly and adequately
protects the consumer and the League.

157. Id. at 781.

